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Abstract
Background: Translational researchers need robust IT solutions to access a range of data types, varying from public
data sets to pseudonymised patient information with restricted access, provided on a case by case basis. The
reason for this complication is that managing access policies to sensitive human data must consider issues of data
confidentiality, identifiability, extent of consent, and data usage agreements. All these ethical, social and legal
aspects must be incorporated into a differential management of restricted access to sensitive data.
Methods: In this paper we present a pilot system that uses several common open source software components in
a novel combination to coordinate access to heterogeneous biomedical data repositories containing open data
(open access) as well as sensitive data (restricted access) in the domain of biobanking and biosample research. Our
approach is based on a digital identity federation and software to manage resource access entitlements.
Results: Open source software components were assembled and configured in such a way that they allow for
different ways of restricted access according to the protection needs of the data. We have tested the resulting pilot
infrastructure and assessed its performance, feasibility and reproducibility.
Conclusions: Common open source software components are sufficient to allow for the creation of a secure
system for differential access to sensitive data. The implementation of this system is exemplary for researchers
facing similar requirements for restricted access data. Here we report experience and lessons learnt of our pilot
implementation, which may be useful for similar use cases. Furthermore, we discuss possible extensions for more
complex scenarios.
Keywords: Data Access, Translational Research, Clinical Data, Biomedical Data, Health Data Protection
Background
Translational research is a promising approach to speed
up discovery of new therapies and diagnostic methods.
In order to realise such objective, tight collaboration of
biomedical researchers and clinical practitioners is re-
quired [1, 2]. Their work is data intensive [3, 4] and
must rely on information technology to enable efficient
data exchange and analysis [5, 6]. Compared to more
traditional drug research, access to a larger variety of
trials from diverse sources can improve the characterisa-
tion of benefits and unwanted effects of drugs and ther-
apies at lower costs and better efficiency [7]. Drug
approval processes and drug safety/effectiveness surveil-
lance are improved by faster access to data about active
ingredients similar to the ones being under consider-
ation. An example of that is the effectiveness of using
existing evidence, or even the prior obligation to make
trial outcomes publicly available, to prevent selective
reporting [8, 9], that is, the presentation of evidence that
is favourable for the interest of the reporter (such as
having a drug approved), and the exclusion of unfavour-
able evidence. Another potential advantages of these
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approaches is making clinical experimentation more effi-
cient and avoiding the exposure of trial’s potential par-
ticipant to known risks, as well as, for instance in the
case that evidence shows adverse effects to particular
health conditions, avoiding unnecessary risks. Ability to
perform data analyses other than those for which clinical
trials were originally conducted is another opportunity
that clinical data sharing offers [10], which is relevant in
the translational research field, enabling approaches like
comparative genomics [11, 12]. Overall, this has social
benefits such as faster improvement of healthcare and
its safety, and increasing the confidence of the general
public in the scientific community, public services and
industry [10]. On the other hand, dealing with biomed-
ical information, and with human patient data in par-
ticular, poses complex challenges with respect to ethical,
legal and social implications (ELSI [13, 14]), which need
to be addressed when software products are developed
and IT infrastructures deployed [15, 16]. An obvious ex-
ample is the wish and right of patients to keep their
health information private, which can be motivated by
various reasons, including the kind of relationship that
an individual wants to maintain with his relatives and
social relations [17, 18], the social stigma associated to
certain diseases [19, 20], and access to private healthcare
[21]. Another reason to resist data sharing lies in the
commercial or academic interests of researchers, includ-
ing the willingness to be the first to submit unpublished
research, and the wish to produce evidence useful to file
patent applications [22, 23]. These issues pose potential
conflicts with the research needs. For instance, anonymi-
zation and reidentification-prevention techniques, which
are used to grant data access while ensuring patient priv-
acy, imply that data essential for a research goal might
be concealed from the researchers [24, 25].
Life science shares technological challenges with other
areas of science [26], and generic technological solutions
can be employed, either of commercial or open source
type [6, 27–29]. However, addressing ELSI in the transla-
tional research arena is particularly difficult, due to the
above mentioned reasons, which can be summarised as
heterogeneity of information systems, different types of
professional roles involved, the conflicting needs to
share information and, at the same time, ensure this is
done in a way that respects patients and associated legis-
lation [30–32]. The domain of biobanking and biosam-
ple research is characterised by special restrictive sample
and data usage conditions, since highest ethical stan-
dards to ensure the support and participation of human
research participants are required. In addition to confi-
dentiality, consent about the data usage, intellectual
property and data/sample ownership must be consid-
ered. Sophisticated mechanisms to provide restricted ac-
cess to sensitive data is a way to address this problem.
The risk of improper use of the data can be mitigated
through legally binding agreements, subscribed by trial
participants and researchers, which constrain the pur-
pose for which data access is granted. Access is mediated
by some form of a data access agreement between a data
consumer and a data provider. These access agreements
have to take into account legal and ethical requirements,
professional guidance, and good practices. Agreements
are in general executed by data stewards or data access
committees, but recently they are implemented in elec-
tronic form employing software for identity and access
management. This approach is not without difficulties,
such as the impossibility to foresee useful research goals
at the time of data and consensus collection [9, 10].
However, it can be seen as a compromise between the
different needs that it addresses.
In this paper we report on a pilot implementation
(from now on, ‘the pilot’) that aims at integrating re-
search resources and clinical resources, including data
bound to a varying range of access policies, from fully
open to data requiring access approval. Implemented in
the context of the BioMedBridges project [33–35], the
pilot shows how identity and permissions management
can be simplified by means of a modular approach, util-
izing well known software components.
The BioMedBridges project
The European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures
(ESFRI) initiative has been promoting an agenda to build
Research Infrastructures (RIs) in Europe since 2002 [36].
Its current agenda comprises 21 projects in all scientific
fields. This includes RIs for the life science area, several of
which teamed up in the FP7 BioMedBridges project. The
main aim of this project was to facilitate the translation of
ideas into medical applications, by promoting data inter-
operability in a variety of disciplines, across different
scales. The project concentrated on five use cases, includ-
ing cross-species data integration, personalised medicine,
imaging, and structural biology. This work was supported
by technological, cross-domain activities, such as termin-
ology and data standards harmonisation [37], and secure
access to data. The latter was investigated both from the
point of view of ELSI, as well as what concerns the realisa-
tion of concrete IT solutions. All reports of the project are
available [38]. The pilot presented here is documented in
detail in the report D5.4 [39], which was preceded by the
analysis and design done for D5.3 [40] and by the prepara-
tory investigations on ELSI topics in D5.1 [40, 41] and
D5.2 [42].
Methods
In the following we describe the software components that
we have employed to deal with the use case addressed by
the pilot.
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The EBI Biosamples Database
The Biosamples Database (BioSD [43, 44]) is a public
repository focused on biological sample information,
which is maintained by the European Bioinformatics
Institute (EBI). Its rationale is to provide a single access
point to the information about the bio-materials used in
biological and/or medical research. The users of this
resource can search for biomedical samples of interest
(e.g., based on phenotypical characteristics), and then
navigate to external resources for accessing the data
generated on those sample (e.g., microarray data in
ArrayExpress [45], proteomics data in PRIDE [46]).
Among other benefits, BioSD can aid translational
research, since summarised clinical trial data and other
information on medical samples are a significant part of
its contents. For instance, one can perform a search
based on a disease (e.g., using the keyword ‘leukemia’)
and find results related both to clinical research (e.g., the
sample group ‘SAMEG158683’, concerning human pa-
tients and coming from the COSMIC repository [47]),
and model organisms (e.g., the group ‘SAMEG22290’,
linked to mouse transcription data in ArrayExpress).
BBMRI Hub and biobanks
BBMRI (Biobanks and Biomolecular Resources Research
Infrastructure) is a European research infrastructure
[48]. The BBMRI-LPC (BBMRI - Large Prospective
Cohorts) project [49] aims to build a network for large
European prospective studies in order to facilitate trans-
national research about human health and diseases. The
‘LPC Catalogue’ [50], based on the MIABIS standard
[51] and data warehouse techniques, provides a struc-
tured overview of the cohorts participating in the
BBMRI-LPC project and supports researchers in gaining
access to their biomaterials. For the purpose of the pilot
we set up an adapted instance of the LPC Catalogue, the
‘BBMRI Hub’ [52]. It provides enhanced functionalities
for access to detailed data, including information about
individual human samples stored in external biobanks.
Moreover, the Shibboleth and REMS systems (see below)
were integrated in the hub, enabling identity manage-
ment and access control.
Resource Entitlement Management System
The Resource Entitlement Management System (REMS
[53]) is an open source software that can be used to
manage policies for granting access to resources, includ-
ing digital data [54]. For instance, a data manager may
establish that an application procedure is required to
access clinical data from a web application like BBMRI
Hub, and information about the purpose of the research,
or approaches to data protection need to be provided by
the applicant and approved by the Data Access Committee
(DAC). REMS allows data managers to define per-resource
authorisation workflows, which can be used by software
systems to ensure users are entitled to see the data re-
quested, and, if not, it facilitates the actions needed for
the access to be granted. REMS centralises and simpli-
fies procedures that are often bureaucratic and hard to
keep track of. REMS can be integrated with Shibboleth
(see the next section), both for the delegation of user
authentication, and for the distribution of the entitle-
ment attributes granted by the DACs to authorise
access to protected data.
REMS is an mean to manage the agreements between
multiple data owners, data sets and data users. As such,
it flexibly delegates these responsibilities to DACs and to
the contents of the data access agreements that REMS
allow DAC members to define. This approach has been
successfully used with the European Genome-phenome
Archive, which of data access is based on REMS [55].
Identity Management via Shibboleth
In an interconnected world, where multiple providers
are able to serve integrated Internet applications and
provide a uniform user experience across them, standar-
dised approaches to manage digital identities are ever
more important. The identity federation standard SAML
is one of the most popular solutions of this kind. Open
source implementations, such as Shibboleth [56], are
available for many platforms and applications. Shibboleth
offers relatively simple methods to wrap areas of a web
application (e.g., via URL patterns), so that, before serving
a web request, an unauthenticated user can be forwarded
to a common login process, where (s)he can select an
identity provider (IdP), such as the authentication system
managed by their organisation. After authentication,
Shibboleth creates a user session, filling it with identity
attributes, which are sent back to the original request
(via browser forwarding), where the application (acting
as a service provider, SP) can check the existence of a
session and the associated attributes. A single session
can be shared by multiple SPs, thus allowing for centra-
lised accounts and single sign-on. Moreover, SPs can en-
rich the Shibboleth session with their own user-specific
attributes. This means that, in our pilot, REMS can send
resource entitlements approved for a user to the resources
needing to check for their existence. Based on the SAML
standard [57], Shibboleth represents a flexible, standards-
compliant solution to decouple application logic from ap-
plication access and permissions management, delegating
the latter to organisation-wide identity managers (e.g.,
institute’s account directory and management). This is
usually arranged into identity federations, essentially
sets of organisations, identity providers, and applications
where there is mutual trust among the participating
parties. This is relevant to the management of sensi-
tive data, where, for example, policies might require
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specific forms of identity proofing, such as presenting
a government-issued photo-ID document to a registra-
tion authority.
Results
Figure 1, taken from the previously mentioned Biomed-
Bridges report [39], summarises the workflow that we
have implemented in the pilot presented in this paper,
based on previous work within the BiomedBridges pro-
ject [40, 41]. This workflow supports the use case where
a researcher is looking for samples of interest, both hu-
man and non-human, with an aim to explore experi-
mental data derived from such samples, as well as
acquire bio-material for further studies. As discussed
above, EBI’s Biosamples Database is a significant starting
point for such a use case. We uploaded summaries
about demonstration data sets onto BioSD, linking them
to more detailed information available in the BBMRI
Hub. For instance, a search initiated from BioSD (step 1
in the figure) might lead (step 2) to the page about the
data set named DE_Biobank7.1 The decision to use real-
istic demo data, which does not belong to real patients,
allowed us to concentrate on the technical issues, leaving
aside the legal and ethical implications.
The BBMRI Hub provides summary information for the
requested dataset (e.g., number of samples for each bio-
logical characteristic), and mediates the access to individ-
ual level data (e.g., anonymised patient records). Namely,
the Hub checks that the requesting client has an associ-
ated Shibboleth session (it uses the Shibboleth Java API,
and the SP plug-in for the Apache web server). If this is
not the case, the Shibboleth component transparently re-
directs the user to a sign-on page (step 4; we have set up a
single sign-on demonstration service for the pilot). After
successful authentication the browser is sent back to the
Hub, where the now-existing user session is used to query
REMS-related session attributes. These contain the list of
resource entitlements associated to the user, such as the
access rights the user has for the biobank (s)he is trying to
access. Such information is obtained by coupling REMS
with Shibboleth’s Attribute Authority component (steps 6/
7). If the user does not have the rights to access the re-
quested data, (s)he is forwarded to REMS (again, via
browser redirection), to apply for such access (step 9), i.e.,
provide the research plan, confirm compliance with the
data access agreement etc. The exact workflow for the re-
source access application depends on the resource being
accessed, and REMS allows the data manager to define it.
Once the user has completed his/her application, this is
Fig. 1 The workflow implemented for the BioMedBridges secure access pilot. Taken from [39]
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forwarded to a DAC user for approval. Approved applica-
tions (or rejections) are notified to the applicant via email
messages, which are also used to send a link to resume
the pilot workflow from step 11, i.e., access the protected
biobank. A variant of this workflow can happen at step 8,
when the initial searches can be refined in BBMRI.
Systems robustness, testing and performance considerations
The pilot aims at demonstrating the technical feasibility
to utilize the above workflow in order to mediate access
to data of the LPC Catalogue which is reflected in the
BioSD. As such, we have tested the infrastructure as a
whole with an initial small set of 3 test Shibboleth feder-
ations and about 10 Shibboleth-authenticated users. In
order to perform such tests, we have populated BioSD
and the LPC demo catalogue with information about 14
fictitious human data sets.2 The components that the
pilot is based on have been extensively tested, by both
the original developers and the many organisations that
use them. Both cases include the organisations partici-
pating in the pilot.
As an example, the Biosamples database has been devel-
oped following sound software engineering methodologies,
including extensive use of test-driven coding an unit tests
(for instance, [58, 59]). The repository currently stores
about 5 million samples, grouped into about 58 thousand
data sets, provided by 14 thousand organisations.3 From in-
ternal web server logs, we can estimate that BioSD success-
fully processes on average 158’000 requests per day from
about 28 unique client IP addresses, without significant
traffic peaks. This makes it clear that BioSD is a valuable
resource for biomedical samples, involving a significant
number of users. We keep the user community engaged by
running periodic exercises of user experience [60] and out-
reach activities [61]. Regarding the quality of data and
annotations in BioSD, while this varies due to our aim to
accommodate the needs of as many data submitters as pos-
sible, we host sample information from important and well
known biomedical sources (see previous section), and we
provide ontology-based semi-automatic data reannotation,
which improve the original metadata [62].
As another example, at the time writing the LPC Cata-
logue contains data about 22 large population-based bio-
banks, including two European networks (MORGAM,
EPIC), and data about more than 3.8 million biosamples
comprising more than 9 material types (e.g. DNA, cDNA/
RNA, whole blood, blood cell isolates, serum, plasma, tis-
sues, cell lines, urine). Eleven out of the 22 participating
biobanks state to have diseases of the circulatory system as
a focus of research, followed by endocrine, nutritional, and
metabolic diseases, mental and behavioural diseases, as
well as diseases of the respiratory system with ten biobanks
each, respectively. The Catalogue plays an important role
in the context of calls for tender within BBMRI-LPC. Two
out of four proposals which have already been approved
specifically request biosamples from three participating
LPC cohorts each. The other two proposals involve all par-
ticipating LPC cohorts which comprise a sufficiently large
number of cases with obtainable biosamples. Further pro-
posals are under review. This indicates the practicability,
importance and user acceptance of our approach [63].
In order to estimate the performance of an infrastruc-
ture like the pilot, consider the following. According to
performance test results [64], a modestly performant ser-
ver (single or dual-core recent CPUs, up to 12Gb RAM)
can uphold 50–100 Shibboleth requests per second, under
a workload of up to 3500 parallel requests. The same tests
show that Shibboleth scalability is also good, with request
latency staying below 5 s for a workload under 500
threads. In [26] it is shown that these limits are well com-
patible with what we would expect in a scenario like the
one described in the pilot, including the figures about or-
ganisations managing up to 30’000 users per year through
Shibboleth. The above-mentioned figures about BioSD
web traffic are well below the values shown above about
Shibboleth, especially considering that only a small part of
BioSD traffic would come from authenticated users, inter-
ested in protected clinical data. The LPC Catalogue and
REMS are also able to support similar workloads. These
rough figures make us confident that the approach pro-
posed by our pilot is usable from the performance point
of view. Moreover, the results achieved in the BioMed-
Bridges project will be leveraged by the CORBEL project,
which aims at developing harmonised user access to bio-
medical data from research infrastructures [65], and by
the ELIXIR-EXCELERATE [66] project, which will ease
data access in the ELIXIR biomedical network [67].
CORBEL and EXCELERATE are involving 11 and 41
organisations across Europe [68, 69], for a total num-
ber of researchers in the order of hundreds. Again,
these figures are well below the limits mentioned
above.
A further point about robustness lies in the process in
place to create credentials for users participating in an
identity federation like the test federations that we have
set up for the pilot. Clearly homogeneous and safe pro-
cedures must be established for that. While this is not
within the scope of this paper, we wish to make a few
considerations, based on the experience with our organi-
sations and resources. Similarly to other cases [70], all
the pilot participants have well defined security policies.
For instance, EBI has an internal policy such that elec-
tronic credentials are supervised by a senior staff spon-
sor, including initial identity certification.
Discussion
Common open source software components are suffi-
cient to create a secure system for differential restricted
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access to sensitive data. The components used to imple-
ment the pilot are freely reusable to realise a similar in-
frastructure in a situation similar to the one we address.
In particular, Shibboleth and REMS can be adapted to a
different set of biomedical resources that other organisa-
tions might want to integrate. Technical details and first
experiences about the pilot implementation are de-
scribed in a report for the BioMedBridges project [39].
Such report includes implementation details that would
be useful for the pilot reproducibility. In this section, we
are discussing the feasibility, advantages and limitations
of our approach, to provide additional information for
researchers confronted with similar data protection
needs when dealing with similar use cases, and explain
our experience with the pilot implementation. Further-
more, we frame the pilot work into a wider legal and
technological context.
Addressing security and data protection issues
The work on the pilot was preceded by a preliminary
assessment of the legal and ethical situation for data
protection and data privacy involved in access and shar-
ing of open data, together with sensitive data, as well as,
on a more technical level, the security risks related to
biomedical data exchange [40]. The STRIDE method-
ology [71] was applied to evaluate security threats. This
consists of analysing well known threats that occur in
software systems (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information Disclosure and Elevation of privileges), asses-
sing the extent to which they are present in the system
under consideration, and establishing countermeasures to
eliminate or reduce the impact of these threats. Addition-
ally, we applied the LINDDUN methodology [40], which
allows for further, privacy-specific threat assessment
(considering the aspects of Linkability, Identifiability,
Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure of information,
Content Unawareness, Policy and Consent Non-
compliance). We reviewed the threats to security and priv-
acy that the pilot (or similar solutions) is able to address
(Table 1), and here we analyse the advantages that our
approach might offer in similar situations.
The combination of Shibboleth and REMS limits the
risk that confidential information is disclosed to un-
authorised persons, by means of simplification and cen-
tralisation. REMS helps in ensuring that data access
authorisations are granted according to the legal require-
ments associated with the data sets (e.g., the kind of
consensus the patients have given). Moreover, the activ-
ity tracking functionality provided by these two tools
offers a basis for keeping evidence of compliance with
law and regulations, and holding users and data man-
agers accountable for their actions. The underlying
SAML standard of Shibboleth mitigates spoofing threats
(i.e., pretending to be someone else or faking invalid
credentials) by exploiting standard and reliable technolo-
gies, such as encryption and digital signature of SAML
messages [72] based on certificates following the X.509
standard [73], or the HTTPS protocol coupled with the
TLS layer [74]. Restricting the session attributes that are
distributed via Shibboleth can reinforce the protection
against spoofing. It is important that the participating
applications use the same security protocols (as BBMRI
Hub, REMS and BioSD do). More general countermea-
sures have been applied to the pilot’s underlying infrastruc-
ture. For instance, redundant web server architectures and
firewall-based IP-filtering have been deployed to both
ensure reliability of the services and minimise the risk of
denial-of-service attacks (DoS [75]). Using logging facilities
and making authentication mandatory allows for user
accountability and non-repudiation (this must be done
according to the local laws, e.g., ensuring periodic deletion
of older entries). Adopting the best software engineering
practices is another general precaution that limits security
and privacy risks. For example, application configurations
are carefully managed, so that unsafe settings (e.g., too
liberal access rights, clear-text passwords) do not com-
promise security or data protection. As another example,
prevention of code injection attacks [76] and thorough
testing [77, 78] give reasonable protection against many
threats.
Regarding the threats identified by the LINDDUN ap-
proach, while the pilot doesn’t address data anonymisa-
tion and identifiability issues, this is delegated to the
data management policies defined at the level of local
biobanks, the managers of which are responsible for col-
lecting informed consent documentation from patients.
This is eased by the functionality available in REMS,
which a data access committee can use to match the
consent given by the patient to specific data uses accord-
ing to the researcher commitments.
Having components grouped in an identity federation
improves user reliability, thanks to the fact that their
identities are verified by mutually trusted organisations.
Further restrictions would be possible, such as prevent-
ing data from leaving a given IT network (hardware-level
encryption [79] could be one way to realise it).
As mentioned above, data access agreements helps in
balancing the advances that are achievable from access
to a wealth of biological data data with the ELSI needs.
Because of that, it is important that the process of grant-
ing access to data and monitoring the access once it is
approved rely on efficient and seamless tools. The ap-
proach used by the pilot has several advantages: the kind
of formal commitment that one needs to use a data set
is clearly associated to the data: the electronic manage-
ment of the interaction between DACs and requestors is
more efficient than the exchange of physical paperwork
and makes it easier to keep track of who has given
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access to who, what and for which purpose. In turn, this
facilitates the procedures to make data accessors ac-
countable for their activities. Moreover, one can leverage
systems like REMS to improve the circulation of data ac-
cess approval processes, including the conditions upon
which such approval is granted. This can extend to trial
participants and the general public, which, in turn, can
improve accountability of and trust in the scientific com-
munity, often an important point in collaborating with
the public for the purpose of obtaining study data.
While not in the scope of this paper, it is worth to
mention that the adoption of systems similar to the pilot
has an economical impact on the management of re-
search and clinical practice. In fact, using open source
components, some of which might already be in place in
many organisations, has the potential for cost reduction,
as well as better control over the technology that is
being deployed. Furthermore, signing data use agree-
ments to clarify commercial aspects in the early stages
of a research activity can prevent disputes over the right
of researchers to publish results based on third party
data, or the interest in exploiting data for patenting and
regulatory purposes.
The problem of common released attributes
A well known, mostly social problem in digital identity
management is the need for every organisation partici-
pating in an identity federation to agree on a common
set of attributes that their IdPs should release, so that
the applications (SPs) can verify a user and the associ-
ated entitlements to resources (as in the case of REMS
entitlements). The general scenario is such that each of
the N IdPs in the federation must distribute the attri-
butes required by every of the M SPs, with a different
set of attributes for each of the N*M pairs, and a corre-
sponding number of negotiations, documents to sign,
etc. While we did not have many parties in the pilot, we
suggest to deal with this problem in a production-grade
infrastructure by means of a proxy agent between IdPs
and SPs. The proxy behaves as a SP for IdPs and as an
IdP for the SPs. This way only M negotiations have to be
made on the attributes needed by SPs, and further N
agreements are made with the IdPs, regarding which at-
tributes they will release to the (trusted) proxy. This
simplifies and reduces the problem to the order of N +
M. The ELIXIR-EXCELERATE project [66] is deploying
a solution based on this approach. It is worth to mention
that we have not addressed other related issues, for in-
stance: a) the fact that organisations tend to be conser-
vative on the release of user attributes, due to concerns
about the personal information laws [80], b) the lack of
standardisation in attribute names and semantics [81].
The proxy approach would help mitigate the impact of
such issues, by uniforming the attributes that the proxy
releases, and by helping the participating organisations
with dealing with the legal issues.
Related work
Many different approaches and systems are used for
tackling the aims and issues we have addressed in the
pilot. Biological material repositories similar to BioSD
exist, varying in scope [82, 83], geographical reference
area [84] and scale [85, 86]. BioSD is mainly a European
reference resource for public biosample data and meta-
data. A similar variety exists in the arena of clinical data
resources [87]. In this field, the LPC Catalogue is among
the most prominent biobank catalogues in Europe, while
a wide range of biobanks with different scales and
scopes exist [88]. Several technologies and approaches
are available to manage identities and application access
rights [27–32]. For instance, commercial systems like
OpenID [89] tend to prefer technical simplicity over ad-
vanced features (e.g., identity federation is not a standard
feature within OpenID). We have chosen Shibboleth for
multiple reasons: it is reliable software based on the
SAML standard, it is well-known among research orga-
nisations, and the organisations involved in the pilot
were already using Shibboleth when we started our
work. Permission and access management is an issue
wider than technology, which encompasses IT solutions,
policies like access audits and new personnel checking
and regulatory compliance [16, 90] The access control
used in REMS can be seen as a variant of a lists-based
access control approach (ACL [91]). Compared to simi-
lar products [92–94], REMS is focused on granting re-
source access based on the commitment to a data access
agreement, and the final approval from personnel with
the data access control role. Moreover, REMS allows for
the definition of workflows to obtain and finalise the ac-
cess approval procedures, and it logs the actions during
the execution of these workflows. Finally, both REMS
and the other components we have used are modular
and can be composed into a larger system (e.g., with re-
spect to the distribution of identities). While one might
prefer simpler options on a smaller scale [95], our ap-
proach gives the flexibility to implement larger infra-
structures with existing common technologies. The
approach used in the pilot does not address the further
data protection that is often ensured by establishing dif-
ferent data access levels (e.g., original patient records,
de-identified/obfuscated data, aggregated data, disclos-
ure of only summary statistics, computed at the source
of data [96]) and by classifying users based on user trust-
worthiness [97, 98]. The pilot approach is agnostic with
respect to the resource that is controlled and the specific
protection mechanism that this has in place, which is
made possible by the fact that both Shibboleth and
REMS essentially see a resource as a reference, such as a
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URL to a web application or a web link to a file down-
load. For instance, one might adopt our approach for
mediating access to resources providing data summaries
in ways similar to the BBMRI [98, 99], as well as in case
of resources that grant access to web services [100] and
local computations [96].
The pilot in the context of data access frameworks
In life science increasingly medical data have to be ef-
fectively accessed and linked. This expanding volume of
human data is stored in various databases, repositories,
and patient registries, while protecting data privacy and
the legitimate interests of patients as well as data sub-
jects. Regarding the purpose of ensuring protection of
human data while enabling data sharing, several ap-
proaches have been suggested that range from the cre-
ation of a political framework in the form of resolutions
or treaties, to operational guidelines for data sharing
[101]. Such frameworks include concepts like legitimate
public health purpose, minimum information necessary,
privacy and security standards, data use agreements
[102], ethical codes like the IMIA (International Medical
Informatics Association) Code of Ethics for Health
Information Professionals [103] and AMIA’s (American
Medical Informatics Association) Code of Professional
and Ethical Conduct, guidance for genomic data, and
potential privacy risks [104]. More concrete approaches
are a human rights-based system for an international
code of conduct for genomic and clinical data sharing
[105], recommendations about clinical databases and
privacy protections [106], and healthcare privacy protec-
tion based on differential privacy-preserving methods
(iDASH, integrating Data for Analysis, Anonymization,
and Sharing) [107, 108].
Genetic sequence databases are an important part of
many biomedical research efforts and contained in many
data repositories and biosamples databases. However,
human genetic data should only be made available if it
can be protected so that the privacy of data subjects is
not revealed. The problem is that individual genomic
sequence data (e.g. SNPs) are potentially “identifiable”
using common identifiers [106, 109, 110]. In biobanking
many new population biobanks and cohort studies were
created to produce information about possible associa-
tions between genotype and phenotype, an association
that is important to understand the causes of diseases.
Together with BBMRI, different initiatives exist that ad-
dress the protection of data privacy and that further the
standardization and harmonization of data management
of genomic data and the sharing of data and biosamples,
for example: Public Population Project in Genomics
(P3G [111]), International Society for Biological and
Environmental Repositories (ISBER [112]), Biobank
Standardisation and Harmonisation for Research Excellence
projects [113] and the Electronic Medical Records and
Genomics (eMERGE) Network [11, 114].
The constraints arising from limitations defined by the
informed consent of the data subject have to be reflected
in data access agreements and data transfer agreements.
In general, the rule applies that data can only be made
available to the extent that is allowed under the local
legal requirements relevant for the data provider includ-
ing ethics votes, vote by data access committee and the
consent by the data subject. Data sharing should be an
important part of an overall data management plan,
which is a key element to support data access and sus-
tainability. A data sharing agreement should supplement
and not supplant the data management plan because the
sharing agreement is about relationship building and
trust building. It supports the long term planning and
finding ways to maximize the use of data.
Anonymisation is becoming increasingly more difficult
to achieve due to the increase in health data such as
genomic data that is potentially identifying. As men-
tioned above, although anonymisation is protecting the
privacy needs of the data subjects, it is an imperfect
solution and must be supplemented by additional solu-
tions that build trust and prevent researchers from trying
to identify study subjects. In the end, what is necessary for
research is a culture of responsibility and data governance
when dealing with human data. Building blocks that sup-
port and strengthen such culture are data sharing agree-
ments, strict authentication and authorisation methods
and the monitoring and tracking of data usage. The cre-
ated pilot fits into such efforts, because, by using and
combining several open source components, it created an
efficient authentication and authorisation framework for
the access to sensitive data that can support efforts for
trust building. The pilot must be seen in connection with
the creation of a European Open Science Cloud, a feder-
ated environment for scientific data sharing and reuse,
based on existing and emerging elements [115]. The com-
plexity of current data sharing practices requires new
mechanisms that are more flexible and adjustable and are
employing proven components, like the open source
authentication components of the pilot.
Possible future developments
Ethical, legal and social implications
As already mentioned above, ethical, legal and social im-
plications (ELSI) are of utmost importance when dealing
with management of human health data [13–16]. The
BioMedBridges project has extensively worked on such
issues and the associated software tools [39–42]. In a
scenario like the one presented above, there are several
components and processes where such tools could be in-
tegrated. To guide researchers with no extensive legal
knowledge through the relevant legal requirements, the
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Legal Assessment Tool (LAT) was developed in BioMed-
Bridges [116]. LAT provides researchers with an online,
interactive selection process to characterise the involved
types of data and databases and provides suitable re-
quirements and recommendations for concrete data
access and sharing situations. Links to the LAT [117]
were added to the BBMRI Hub, in order to guide data
managers when assessing the data sharing policies that
should be adopted for the data sets managed in the
system, as well as the implications of granting access to
them. The Human Sample Exchange Regulation Navigator
(hSERN), a web resource about legal aspects involved in
exchanging human information [118], is another resource
that would be useful to both biobank providers and REMS
users having the DAC role. The BBMRI Legal Wiki [119]
is a similar resource with an EU perspective, which
could be useful when data need to be exchanged across
EU member countries. The International Policy interoper-
ability and data Access Clearinghouse (IPAC [120]), a tool
serving information about policy interoperability on
international level, could provide more direct help to
the members of DACs who need to craft forms within
REMS to be presented to users applying for dataset
access. In fact, IPAC contains form templates reusable
for such a purpose. Data sharing for research purposes
must be opened for human health data, and these tools
are means to clarify the conditions for data sharing.
They can complement our pilot implementation of a
system for restricted data access, providing each com-
ponents with appropriate safeguards, restrictions and
responsibilities and in this way supporting a culture of
responsibility and data governance for the sharing of
human data.
Batch and programmatic access to data
The pilot focuses on software components that interact
with users via the web. Extensions for programmatic
access that are inspired by our solution could be imple-
mented relatively easily. For instance, if an approved
user needs to access the BBMRI Hub from an applica-
tion or a web service that (s)he is running (or such ac-
cess is triggered by the main web application the user is
interacting with), this component would work like a web
browser, forwarding IdP and REMS-related requests.
Shibboleth has sample implementations [121] to make a
web service aware of the fact that a data request might
return an IdP-related link and needs to be forwarded
elsewhere. Unattended batch processing programs would
work in a similar way, although they would likely need
security reinforcement, for example by means of time-
limited authentication tokens and key pairs [12]. A par-
ticular type of web service is represented by SPARQL
endpoints to serve linked data [122–124], which are in-
creasingly important in life sciences, and which have
been widely studied in BioMedBridges [37, 125]. In
addition to considering this type of access just like any
other web service and thus applying what we have out-
lined above, it would be worthwhile to consider more
specific approaches, which analyse SPARQL queries to
decide how to dispatch them across protected data
repositories, on the basis of defined access policies
[126–128]. In the context of the pilot, such access
policies could be provided to a federated query engine
by integrating it with Shibboleth and REMS. As a final
note, one should take into account the impact of these
techniques on ELSI, e.g., it might be the case that the
law requires explicit consent for sending data to a third
party component, such as a web service.
Conclusion
Protected access to digital resources related to transla-
tional research is a significant challenge that encom-
passes technology, law, ethics and society, and the
importance of this for translational research is growing.
In the work presented we have shown an approach to
face this challenge, based on open, common components
and standards. In addition to showing the feasibility of
such an approach, our pilot for secure biomedical data
access can be a reference for similar data access use
cases and can offer useful experience and lessons learned
for researchers confronted with similar data protection
needs. Moreover, it encourages researchers to use open
source components as the basis to integrate ELSI tools
into data management software, as well as for develop-
ing more complex usage scenarios, such as data access
based on web services and linked data technologies. The
pilot can be a model for researchers who want to use
readily available open source modules to create a solu-
tion for the handling of sensitive data. Compared to
other solutions, our approach is simple yet effective,
being focused on the authentication and authorisation
problem, without dealing with the technical about the
access to specific resources. This also means it is rela-
tively easy to realise a pilot-like solution over compo-
nents already in place (only some integration work is
needed between those, Shibboleth and REMS, existing
Shibboleth-based IdPs can be reused) and it is not
required to deploy a new infrastructure, as it is the case
for SHRINE [99] and i2b2-based systems [6, 98],
caGRID [93] and DataSHIELD [96]. At the same time
we delegate to systems like Honest Broker [100] ad-
vanced privacy enhancing techniques. The work between
the research infrastructures that have participated in the
pilot is continuing in CORBEL [65] and AARC [129]
projects. In particular, similar production services are
being implemented thanks to the funding provided by
the EXCELERATE initiative.
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Endnotes
1http://www.ebi.ac.uk/biosamples/group/SAMEG299071.
The list of all the data set records uploaded for the pilot
are available at https://goo.gl/SVXZ3A.
2Ibid.
3This can be computed by means of the RDF/SPARQL
endpoint, e.g., https://goo.gl/ti4S34
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